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I. Introduction
In prior work, we took up the question of the TRIPs Agreement’s
resilience to changes in domestic law. We argued that such resilience is
necessary because information production is a dynamic enterprise; that
additions to the domain of knowledge change the intellectual landscape and
alter creative opportunities and challenges. As new industries emerge and
mature, nations must have the flexibility to modify their intellectual
property rules to readjust the balance between public and private rights.1 In
effect, we asked how to understand Article 1(1) of the TRIPs Agreement,
which recognizes member autonomy and gives member states latitude to
comply with their international obligations in ways best suited to their
political, institutional, economic, and social conditions.2
In the course of that study, we examined approaches to TRIPs dispute
resolution that could cabin the choices of legislation available to deal with
emergent substantive problems, and which could distort the legal
environment in which creative enterprises are conducted. We noted the
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Agreement], Annex 1C, 33 I.L.M. 1197, 1198 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs Agreement].

95

96

CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 36:95

literalist and formalist views that TRIPs jurists take to the text of the
Agreement, and argued that these approaches tend to denigrate what we
termed neo-federalist values, values that we saw as internal to the
Agreement and important to–indeed implicit in–the structure of the
international intellectual property system. In this piece, we continue our
consideration of the resilience of the Agreement and its commitment to
neo-federalism. Here, however, we move from a focus on outcomes to the
dynamics of the legislative process, examining the extent to which TRIPs
dispute resolution adequately accommodates the operation of each
member’s political economy as it relates to intellectual property lawmaking.
Frequently, as intellectual property lawmaking becomes fiercely
contested, reforms can only occur when a balanced package of rules can be
reached. Thus, copyright term extension legislation was packaged with a
reduction in the scope of protection for nondramatic musical works (the
latter later found by a WTO panel to violate TRIPs). The same dynamic
was at play with respect to reforms involving patent protection for
pharmaceuticals, where term extension was coupled with rights to
experiment. We ask whether such deals (or perhaps which of such deals,
depending upon the connection between the reforms) should be taken into
account by WTO panels. We argue that when legislation represents
offsetting benefits and detriments, respect for domestic political dynamics
requires panels to consider constituent pieces of such legislation in the
context of the package in which they were enacted.
We acknowledge that both GATT (United States–Section 337) and
WTO (United States–Section 211) jurisprudence have rejected the argument
of substantive equality (or offsetting equality) in adjudicating claims for
violations of national treatment and that, instead, there has been an
insistence on formal equality.3 Thus, a member state has not been able to
successfully argue that, although it applies different rules to nationals of
different countries, equality of treatment in fact results when the applicable
rules are viewed as a whole–that is, when the ways in which particular rules
offset one another are taken into account. In our previous paper, we
questioned whether the jurisprudence that has developed with regard to the
GATT’s trade provisions should apply equally to intellectual property;
whether the structural implications attached to the guarantee of national
treatment are appropriate to other TRIPs obligations; and whether the
formalistic approach taken to trade should be utilized when assessing
compliance with provisions unique to intellectual property, such as
minimum protection standards. We noted that differences between trade
and intellectual property policy mandated different approaches. Here we
3
See GATT Panel Report on United States–Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930,
L/6439-36S/345 (Nov. 7, 1989) [hereinafter Panel Report on United States–Section 337];
Appellate Body Report on United States–Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998,
WT/DS176/AB/R (Jan. 2, 2002) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report on United States–
Section 221].
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reiterate that position, but make something of a converse argument as well:
there are commonalities between the problems that nations experience in
executing their trade commitments and their intellectual property
commitments. Thus, it is significant that in its early years, the GATT
incorporated strategies that created flexibility and permitted nations to deal
autonomously with matters of domestic trade; we argue that similar
mechanisms are required in TRIPs jurisprudence, especially in the
Agreement’s formative stage.
We also focus on the effect that TRIPs, as currently understood, has on
domestic lawmaking. If WTO panel decisions intrude more into national
law, might lawmakers begin to enact legislation in reliance on international
invalidation of whole or parts of the enactment? Should formulation of
domestic policy take this into account? Further, would the formalistic
approach that has been taken to TRIPs jurisprudence benefit domestic
lawmaking by reducing the effect of lobbying? Or would it simply induce
more nuanced log-rolling, or the enactment of laws aimed at influencing
intellectual property production but under a different legislative rubric
(such as food and drug regulation or consumer law)? Indeed, answers to
these questions might affect not only lawmaking at the national level but, in
turn, the form of WTO dispute settlement. We go so far as to suggest that
there may be a role for the (much-feared) nonviolation complaints in
navigating these complexities.
II. Domestic Lawmaking Strategies
As noted above, our previous articles tested the TRIPs Agreement’s
commitment to what we called neo-federalist values, which is to say, the
ability of states to structure their intellectual property laws to deal with
changing internal conditions, including changes within the institutional
structure of their creative industries, changes in the types of works the
country typically produced, and changes in the nature of science or the
technological environment. In those pieces, we looked at how discrete
legislative provisions were assessed by WTO adjudicators and expressed
concern that the analytic approaches they were adopting were not
sufficiently hospitable to national priorities. In fact, however, the
autonomy interests of states, particularly democratic states, may be even
more tightly constrained. Intellectual property laws are not always enacted
as discrete mandates; rather they tend to balance the needs of user groups
against the interests of rights holders. Disaggregating such measures and
testing individual proposals against TRIPs principles ignores this political
reality.
To be sure, in a democracy, packaging is an inherent part of the
legislative process generally: benefits are traded off until a measure is
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produced that commands a majority.4 But in intellectual property
legislation, this dynamic tends to play out in ways that pit different
stakeholders in the creative industries against one another, prompting
tradeoffs internal to the intellectual property system itself. We can only
speculate as to why this is so. Perhaps at one time, the topics were thought
too technical and without substantial political interest; perhaps now that
their significance has been realized, it is because their economic salience
has rendered them acutely controversial. We do, however, note the
centrality of tradeoffs to the intellectual property lawmaking process. One
example is the comprehensive revision of the Copyright Act in 1976, which
is well recognized as the product of direct inter-industry negotiation. It was
essentially a contract among stakeholders in the copyright industries,
embodying tradeoffs and compromises between interested groups, and then
enacted into law by Congress.5 Like all contracts, individual provisions do
not reflect the benefits that any one party extracted; instead, the impact of
the Act on particular intellectual property holders depends on how the Act
applies as a whole.
A similar approach can be seen in more targeted legislation. Consider,
for example, the “Irish bar” provision, which was added to the Copyright
Act in 1998 to exempt certain public performances of nondramatic musical
works in bars and restaurants from the scope of copyright liability. This
exemption was enacted as a part of a political package that included the
extension of the copyright term by twenty years. The net result–the Sonny
Bono Copyright Term Extension Act6–thus contained benefits to all
copyright holders, in exchange for a reduction in protection for a few
copyright holders. The same lawmaking dynamic can be observed in the
enactment of patent law. An example is the 1984 extension of the term of
patent protection on pharmaceuticals subject to regulatory review.7 In
4

Indeed, one could argue that this was the core problem with the Line Item Veto Act, 2
U.S.C. § 691, which allowed the President to “cancel in whole” certain provisions that had
been signed into law: it gave the President power to unravel legislation in order “to reward
one group and punish another[.]” Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 434 & 451
(1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
5

See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 743 (1989) (noting
that the 1976 Copyright Act, “which almost completely revised existing copyright law, was
the product of two decades of negotiation by representatives of creators and copyright-using
industries, supervised by the Copyright Office and, to a lesser extent, by Congress”); Jessica
D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857, 860861 (1986-1987) (“[M]ost of the statutory language was not drafted by members of
Congress or their staffs at all. Instead, the language evolved through a process of
negotiation among authors, publishers, and other parties with economic interests in the
property rights the statute defines.”).
6

Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827
(1998).
7

35 U.S.C. § 156 (2002).
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exchange for lengthening the term, that Act reduced the scope of protection
by permitting unauthorized use of patented pharmaceuticals for the purpose
of specified experimentation–to generate information needed to clear
generic substitutes for marketing.8 The net result–the Drug Price
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act (commonly called the HatchWaxman Act)9–was a package that added to the protection enjoyed by
patent holders in the pharmaceutical industries, while at the same time,
accelerated public access to cheaper products after patent termination.
But despite the obvious tradeoffs inherent in these legislative
measures, WTO adjudicators analyzed them as discrete reforms. In the
case of the Sonny Bono Act, the Irish bar provision, § 110(5), was the
subject of a complaint by the EU (prompted by Ireland) and it was
invalidated by a dispute settlement panel under the TRIPs Agreement.10
Significantly (in our view), the panel’s 120-page analysis never alluded to
the provision’s complicated etymology or to the compromise it entailed.
The Hatch-Waxman Act was not the subject of a challenge, but a somewhat
analogous Canadian law was. The Canadian law included the regulatory
review provision, along with another scope-reducing measure that allowed
a manufacturer to stockpile inventory for six months before the patent on
the invention expired. The Canadian law did not, however, include any
patent-enhancing features. Although the WTO panel noted this key
difference between Canadian and American law,11 it clearly did not believe
that the absence of a tradeoff should in any way affect the panel’s
decision.12
This “discrete” approach to adjudication (by which we mean that
discrete parts of legislative compromises are broken out for individual
assessment) can produce perverse consequences. Not only does it unravel
carefully negotiated legislative deals, it does so in a systematic way.
Because TRIPs sets only minimum standards, WTO dispute resolution
8

35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (2003). This is often called the “Bolar exemption.”

9

Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Registration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417,
98 Stat. 1585 (1984).
10

See WTO Panel Report on United States–Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act,
WT/DS160/R (June 15, 2000) [hereinafter Panel Report on United States–Section 110(5)].
11

WTO Dispute Panel Report on Canada-Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products,
WT/DS114/R (Mar. 17, 2000) [hereinafter Panel Report on Canada–Pharmaceutical
Products] ¶¶ 4.28 nn.146-147, 4.31(b) (noting the distinction); id. at ¶ 7.47 (putting no
weight on regulatory review exemptions in other countries); id. at ¶¶ 7.78-7.79, 7.82 (no
weight on different approaches to accompanying extensions). The United States, the EU, and
Australia appeared to argue that weight should be given to the fact that the Bolar exemption
was accompanied by the creation of a special protection certificate that extended the term of
patent protection for pharmaceutical products. See id. at ¶¶ 4.28 n. 146, 4.36.
12

Id. at ¶ 8.1 (upholding the regulatory review exemption and invalidating the stockpiling
exemption).
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operates as a one-way ratchet: complaints can lead to the invalidation of
measures that reduce the level of intellectual property protection, but they
never reach measures that increase protection. Thus, compromises will
always unravel in the same direction, requiring nations to change those
features of their legislation that benefit user groups while protectionenhancing provisions stay in place.
Of course, user groups may be able to challenge a protectionenhancing measure in a domestic court, claiming that the increase in
protection undermines national values and constitutive agreements that
protect public access. For example, the other half of the Sonny Bono Act–
the term extension benefit given to copyright holders–was challenged as
going beyond congressional authority. If such a challenge invoked the
same level of scrutiny that the WTO gives to reductions in protection, the
systematic effect would be corrected. However, that is not the case. The
term extension in the Sonny Bono Act was subjected to an extremely
deferential standard of review–ironically, a standard that deferred not only
to congressional judgments, but also allowed such judgments to be based in
part upon international considerations.13 As a result, although the Irish bar
provision was struck down in the WTO, the term extension was upheld by
the Supreme Court.14
To make matters worse, this is an iterative process. We leave a full
examination of the possibilities to game theorists; for purposes of this
article, it is worth noting that as interest groups come to understand the
situation, they will utilize it. Intellectual property holders may become
quick to agree to provisions that reduce the level of protection in exchange
for the protection-enhancing legislation that they want, knowing that the
reductions will be successfully challenged at the international level.

13
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 205-206 (2003) (concluding that the copyright term
extension was a rational exercise of the legislative authority conferred by the Copyright
Clause in part because “Congress sought to ensure that American authors would receive the
same copyright protection in Europe as their European counterparts,” and because absent
legislative flexibility “the United States could not ‘play a leadership role’ in the give-andtake evolution of the international copyright system”) (quoting Shira Perlmutter,
Participation in the International Copyright System as a Means to Promote the Progress of
Science and Useful Arts, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 323, 331 (2002)).
14

Cf. R. Anthony Reese, Copyright Term Extension and the Scope of Congressional
Power – Eldred v. Ashcroft, 7 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 5, 31-32 (2004) (noting the different
levels of review, and deference to legislators, when legislation is reviewed under the U.S.
Constitution and under TRIPs).
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Indeed, because interest groups transcend borders, it may even be that
domestic rights holders actively promote such challenges themselves.15
Alternatively, user groups may be less willing to consider compromise, or
they may try to end-run a TRIPs challenge by burying provisions that
pertain to intellectual property laws in legislation that is less obviously
subject to WTO scrutiny, such as food and drug, consumer protection,
telecommunications law, or other regulatory provisions. In the end, nations
lose the flexibility to deal effectively and transparently with the issues that
emerge at the frontiers of knowledge-production.
III. A Vision of the Relationship Between National and International
Lawmaking
Previously, we attributed the problems that TRIPs poses to domestic
lawmaking, in part, to the rote application of trade principles to intellectual
property. In a sense, the problem identified here is the converse: the failure
to treat trade and intellectual property similarly when each exhibits the
same needs. Thus, in the earliest years of multilateral trade negotiations,
there were fears that national priorities and the dynamics of domestic
lawmaking might undermine the emerging international order. To
accommodate those concerns, the text of the 1947 GATT, as expanded in
subsequent rounds and later subsumed within the WTO trade regime,
includes cushioning–provisions that save the agreement as a whole even
when a member cannot fulfill particular obligations. For example, the
General Exceptions provision of Article XX permits members to deal with
issues of overarching national importance, such as preservation of public
morals, health, and cultural treasures.16 Under Article XXVIII, a state that
finds it necessary to reduce concessions in one sector is permitted to

15

Cf. MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS WITHOUT BORDERS:
ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1998). For example, the Irish Music
Rights Organization that was at the forefront of the effort to have the EU bring a challenge
against Section 110(5) of the United States Copyright Act, works closely (as one would
expect) with performing rights organizations in the United States, who (in addition to the
composers they represented) were the principal domestic losers as a result of Section 110(5).
To a large extent, these concerns are an analogue to Dirk De Bièvre’s observation that WTO
adjudication tends to splinter coalitions because cases raise discrete issues and thus
disaggregate the packages that were necessary to achieve consensus at the bargaining table.
See Dirk De Bièvre, International Institutions and Domestic Coalitions: The Differential
Effects of Negotiations and Judicialisation in European Trade Policy (European University
Institute, Working Paper 2003/17, 2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=574501.
16

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 art. XX, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO
Agreement, supra note 2, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1153 (1994) [hereinafter GATT].
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negotiate compensatory concessions in other sectors.17 Similarly, Article
XIX and its associated Agreement on Safeguards allow a nation to suspend
obligations and withdraw concessions on a temporary basis, to give it the
time it needs to mount effective competition against sudden increases in
imports that result from unforeseen developments and cause, or threaten to
cause, serious injury.18
While the enduring significance of these provisions in the trade
context is debatable (an issue to which we will later return), the absence of
similar safeguards to protect the viability of the TRIPs Agreement in its
early years is striking. Although there are general provisions akin to Article
XX to accommodate national concerns over public health and morals,19
there are few escapes that allow states to deal effectively with emerging
domestic priorities or, for that matter, to grapple efficiently with
technological and scientific developments. Article 31 of the TRIPs
Agreement bears resemblance to Article XIX in that it too allows for
temporary derogation from otherwise applicable norms by permitting
compulsory licenses in the case of national emergencies. But, as the need
for the Doha Ministerial Declaration on TRIPs and Public Health
demonstrated, that provision is (even in the case of national emergency)
narrowly circumscribed, and in any event is too focused a provision to be of
great effect.20 Similarly, the “three part” exception tests of Arts. 13 and 30
17

GATT art. XXVIII (2) (providing, in part, that: “the contracting parties concerned shall
endeavour to maintain a general level of reciprocal and mutually advantageous concessions
not less favourable to trade than that provided for in this Agreement prior to such
negotiations.”).
18

GATT art. XIX (1)(a) (providing, in part, that: “If, as a result of unforeseen
developments and of the effect of the obligations incurred by a contracting party under this
Agreement . . . any product is being imported into the territory of that contracting party in
such increased quantities and under such conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury to
domestic producers . . . the contracting party shall be free . . . to suspend the obligation in
whole or in part or to withdraw or modify the concession.”). See also Agreement on
Safeguards, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, supra note 2, Annex 1A, 33 I.L.M. 112 (1994)
(intending to clarify the application of Article XIX). Cf. Jide Nzelibe, The Credibility
Imperative: The Political Dynamics of Retaliation in the World Trade Organization’s
Dispute Resolution Mechanism (University of Chicago Law School, Public Law and Legal
Theory Working Paper No. 55, 2004), available at http://www.ssrn.com/
abstract_id=495571. See generally ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, PUBLIC CONTROLS ON
INTERNATIONAL TRADE § 7.2 (2d ed. 1983).
19
20

See, e.g., TRIPs Agreement, supra note 2, arts. 8, 27(2), 31(b).

See WTO 4th Doha Ministerial Conference, Declaration on the TRIPs Agreement and
Public Health, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (Nov. 14, 2001), available at www.wto.org/english/
thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/ mindecl_trips_e.htm [hereinafter Declaration on the TRIPs
Agreement and Public Health]; see also WTO General Council, Implementation of
Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPs Agreement and Public Health,
WT/L/540
(Aug.
30,
2003),
available
at
www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/implem_para6_e.htm.
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permit members to derogate from protection, but only in highly delimited
circumstances.21
If TRIPs is to endure, we believe that comparable strategies are
necessary–that the institutional and international concerns that prompted
caution in the early stages of the GATT trade regime need to be recognized
in the intellectual property context as well. In Part A below, we explore
ways that the compensatory-concessions philosophy of Article XXVIII
could be imported into intellectual property dispute settlement through an
analysis that takes tradeoffs into account. In Part B, we adapt the
temporary-suspension philosophy of Article XIX to suggest ways in which
a time dimension could be used to allow states to respond to changes in the
level of exclusivity resulting from scientific and technological
developments. We do not in this paper fully describe how the analysis
should proceed, although options include altering the burden of proof in
cases where the challenged action is part of a tradeoff, or treating such
cases as nonviolation complaints which would require the complaining state
to establish additional elements, such as an intent to inflict harm or distort
intellectual property markets.22 Instead, we elaborate on the different types
of tradeoff that could be imagined, and assess their respective claims to
benefit from the neo-federalist value of state autonomy that we seek to
advance.
A. Tradeoffs
Above, we characterized domestic lawmaking in the intellectual
property arena as quasi-contractual, involving tradeoffs among interest
groups. Admittedly, not all legislative schemes that contract intellectual
property rights involve tradeoffs.
For example, the Omnibus
Appropriations Act of 1998 included, along with budget allocations,
provisions on a miscellany of issues–among them, the ban on ownership of
Cuban-related trademarks (which was later successfully challenged in the
WTO23). It did not include any compensating measures that enhanced
intellectual property–let alone trademark–protection. Nothing in what we
say here would affect the assessment of measures enacted in this way.
However, where intellectual property provisions come into law
through a process of give-and-take among stakeholders in the creative
industries, we suggest that there are circumstances where that process
should be taken into account. As suggested above, this sort of calculus
21

Exceptions must be limited, must not unreasonably conflict with normal exploitation of
the protected work, or unreasonably prejudice the right holder (taking account, in the case of
patents, of the interests of third parties). See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 2, arts. 13, 30.
22

The TRIPs Council is currently considering the role for non-violation complaints.

23

See Appellate Body Report on United States–Section 211, supra note 3.
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would not be entirely novel in that it can be seen as analogous to Article
XXVIII of the 1947 GATT. As Kyle Bagwell and his coauthors explain,
the theory underlying Article XXVIII is that a state that adopts a policy
impinging on its trade commitments can nonetheless be regarded as GATTcompliant if balancing concessions maintain market access overall.24 In the
intellectual property context, where compliance with TRIPs commitments
can raise the price of goods, market exclusivity is a more important metric
than market access. Thus, our argument is that a provision reducing the
level of protection should survive scrutiny so long as it is part of a
legislative deal that preserves market exclusivity overall. There are a
variety of scenarios that should be considered; we focus on those that
reflect actual or likely legislative compromises.
1. Contemporaneous intra-regime tradeoffs
The Sonny Bono Act illustrates perhaps the most typical variation, in
which a specific statutory reform includes both a provision that enhances
protection and one that reduces it within the same intellectual property
regime. As noted above, the danger in such cases is that the different
components of the tradeoff will be subjected to different levels of scrutiny,
notwithstanding that the general level of protection–both before and after
the reform–are approximately constant. If one provision (the decrease in
protection) is invalidated, while the other is upheld, then the bargain is
undone. Thus, we argue that adjudicators should take into account the
broader national context in which the challenged provision was enacted.
Of course, some level of scrutiny of the protection-reducing measure is
required. Even if the same level of overall protection is maintained, it may
be that the reallocation undermines the goals of the GATT as a whole. For
example, balancing broader protection of works that are primarily exported
by shortchanging works that are predominantly of foreign origin could
distort trade–arguably, without violating the national treatment provision.25
Nonetheless, the reduction in protection might be judged to violate
minimum standards.
A TRIPs panel must also consider whether the package does, indeed,
achieve overall balance. However, the standard should not be overly strict
and one to one correspondence between benefits and detriments should not
24
See Kyle Bagwell, Petros C. Mavroidis & Robert W. Staiger, It’s a Question of Market
Access, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 56 (2002). As we discuss later, Art. XXVIII contemplates
negotiation before concessions can be withdrawn.
25
See, e.g., Canada-Pharmaceutical Products, supra note 11. So long as the legislation
focuses on specific economic issues, the impact on particular fields may not be regarded as a
de jure violation of equal treatment provisions. There may be a claim of de facto
discrimination, but as we argue elsewhere, these claims should be subject to rigorous
scrutiny.
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be required. For example, the Sonny Bono Act was overinclusive, in the
sense that the benefits of the Act (term extension) accrued to all copyright
owners, while the contraction (the reduced scope of public performance
rights) affected only holders of rights in nondramatic musical works. But
everyone who lost protection also enjoyed the benefits. Since the
imbalance, overall, was in the direction of increasing copyright protection,
it accords with the protective slant of the Agreement.26
Obviously, valuation of the costs and benefits will present difficult
issues. In the case of Hatch-Waxman, for example, many patent holders
complain that term extension does not fully compensate them for the scope
they lost by the regulatory review exception.27 Furthermore, in cases in
which the tradeoff is underinclusive, in that the parties who were adversely
affected did not enjoy equivalent gains, this approach may not save the
legislation in question.28 However, the fact that this analysis will not
always yield a finding of compliance is not a reason to reject it; indeed, its
more limited application shows that it will not undermine the basic gains of
the TRIPs Agreement secured by intellectual property holders.
2. Contemporaneous inter-regime tradeoffs
There could be situations where a legislature reduces the level of one
form of intellectual property protection while increasing protection in
another intellectual property regime. For example, the U.S. Congress could
decide to eliminate design patents and liberalize trade dress protection for
product designs.29 Similarly, it could limit copyright protection of software
to wholesale piracy of the literal aspects of programs, while explicitly
endorsing the case law holding that software and computer processing are
patentable.30 In both cases the reduction in protection is arguably
26

Of course, if the TRIPs Agreement were modified to include substantive maxima, or
user rights–as we have separately advocated–this analysis would change. See Graeme B.
Dinwoodie, The Institutions of International Intellectual Property Law: New Actors, New
Sources and New Structures, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 98TH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 213, 218 (2004); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss,
TRIPs-Round II: Should Users Strike Back?, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 21 (2004).
27
See Laura J. Robinson, Analysis of Recent Proposals to Reconfigure Hatch-Waxman,
11 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 47, 52 n.42 (2003).
28

Given the relative strength of the interest groups that favor greater protection and the
groups who favor reduced protection, underinclusiveness is a situation that is less likely to
occur in practice.
29

Cf. Atkinson & Yates Boatbuilders Ltd. v. Hanlon, [2003] 27 C.P.R. (4th) 195 (Can.)
(prohibiting manufacture of similar boat hull design under passing off theory, inferring
likelihood of confusion from intentional copying).
30

State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed.
Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999).
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challengeable–the design provision under Article 25 and the software
provision under Article 10(1).
The formalism with which the Agreement is currently interpreted may
make such inter-regime tradeoffs particularly unlikely to be considered by
adjudicators, but we believe that a broader perspective of the overall reform
should again (though in fewer circumstances than with intra-regime
tradeoffs) save particular provisions from invalidation. This argument will
be hardest to make where the TRIPs Agreement explicitly provides for
protection of stated subject matter within specific regimes, as might be the
case, for example, with respect to the protection of software under
copyright law. It might also be difficult where the duration of protection is
precise and differs between regimes, or where other incidents of protection
(such as what amounts to infringement) are clearly stated in the TRIPs
Agreement and radically different from one intellectual property regime to
another.
Nonetheless, undue formalism fails to recognize legal and commercial
realities. The intellectual property regimes are converging such that there
are instances in which particular subject matter could rationally be
protected under more than one rubric. Moreover, regulatory liberalization
of the information industries has facilitated active cross-sectoral
consolidation, particularly in the media.31 The result is that players in these
sectors are less invested in specific strategies, or in particular intellectual
property rights, for appropriating gains and recapturing investments. At the
same time, these changes may require nations to experiment with different
legal approaches in order to decide which works best; in the interim,
protection may become excessive. Thus, it is quite important that the
TRIPs Agreement not be read to prevent member states from switching
legal regimes or rolling back excessive protection to the international
minimum.32
For example, the abolition of the U.S. design patent system could
instigate a complaint against the United States on the grounds of Article 25
of the TRIPs Agreement. But trade dress protection for product design
under §43(a) of the Lanham Act arguably provides a scope of protection
which, while not identical, is comparable (and probably in practice more
effective) than that available through the current design patent system. If
31

See Yochai Benkler, A Political Economy of the Public Domain: Markets in Innovation
Goods Versus the Marketplace of Ideas, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 267, 291-292 (Rochelle
Cooper Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001).
32
Of course, the values attendant to national legislative flexibility are not limited to those
advanced in this paper. See Graeme W. Austin, Valuing “Domestic Self-Determination” in
International Intellectual Property Jurisprudence, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1155 (2002);
Graeme B. Dinwoodie, A New Copyright Order: Why National Courts Should Create Global
Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 469 (2000).
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the abolition of the patents on design prompted a challenge under Article
25, could the United States claim that the expansion of trade dress
protection satisfied its TRIPs obligations? The thresholds for protection
and the subject matter of industrial design protection under Article 25 are
amenable to the application of widely different rules in national law. In
such a case, the ability of producers to capture the amount of return
guaranteed by the design provisions of the TRIPs Agreement should be
accorded greater weight than the form that the protection takes.
Again, the existence of a tradeoff should not be considered dispositive
of compliance. Further examination is needed. As noted above,
compliance with minimum standards requires rough equality between the
tradeoffs. Adjudicators should also make sure that the change does not
violate other TRIPs guarantees. Further, when the intellectual property
regime is changed, a finding of compliance should depend on whether the
affected parties have to make fresh investments in order to take advantage
of the substitute form of protection.33
3. Contemporaneous external tradeoffs
The hardest case for taking account of legislative tradeoffs is presented
by the situation where the benefits are accorded outside the forms of
protection encompassed by the TRIPs Agreement. For example, although
the principal offsets in the Hatch-Waxman Act are found in the Patent Act,
the deal was partially executed through provisions in the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetics Act (FDA).34 Presumably, other tradeoffs could be enacted in
this way as well, and there could be situations where the benefits to user
groups (the protection-reducing measures) are in intellectual property
legislation while the protection-enhancing provisions are in other laws.
Should this legislative strategy affect the weight given to the tradeoff?
Given the formalism of TRIPs dispute resolution, it seems unlikely
that nonintellectual property provisions would be considered to satisfy
TRIPs obligations. Indeed, because the TRIPs Agreement expressly
permits substitution of non-intellectual property regimes in certain clearly

33

By “fresh investments,” we do not mean to suggest that the need to make application to
receive protection rather than receive automatic protection should of itself preclude the
alternative form of protection from satisfying TRIPs obligations (unless the Agreement
specifically mandated protection without formalities, such as the Berne Convention does for
copyright).
34
The main provisions are in the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 156 and 271(e). However,
provisions regarding the way in which generic producers challenge patents are to receive
compensation for such challenges are found in 21 U.S.C. § 355. See generally, Alfred B.
Engelberg, Special Patent Provisions for Pharmaceuticals: Have They Outlived Their
Usefulness?, 39 IDEA 389 (1999).
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identified cases,35 reliance on outside regimes in other circumstances could
meet an expressio unius est exclusio alterius response. Even when viewed
less formalistically, there might be problems. Relying on compensating
protections that are outside the intellectual property system (as defined by
TRIPs) has many of the same problems as other tradeoff analyses.
Valuation problems are exacerbated because the forms of protection are
likely to differ sharply from those of standard intellectual property regimes.
In addition, shifting the regime of protection may radically undermine
investment-based expectations (reliance interests) that are at the heart of the
TRIPs bargain. Looking back at the design example in the previous
section, because design producers were surely aware of trade dress
protection when they made their initial investments, their expectations
would not be dashed by abolishing design patent protection. Similarly,
players in the pharmaceutical business are well informed about the
regulatory regime imposed by the FDA.36 In other situations, the change in
regimes may be less foreseeable and more disruptive. For instance,
switching from a patent system to a bounty system or to a tax subsidy
regime would present problems. The returns, and the rate at which they are
provided, are highly dissimilar.37 There would be transition problems for
those who made their investments in reliance on patent protection because
they may not be in a position to fully utilize their tax benefits to offset
costs. Further, an assessment of equivalence should arguably take into
account the indirect, nonmonetary benefits of the regime relinquished. For
example, patents are used for signaling and to facilitate cross-licensing and
pooling; similar benefits may not be available in a tax system.38
But there may be circumstances when such tradeoffs should be taken
into account. As the FDA and design examples demonstrate, the impact of
change on a rights holder’s expectations will not always be dramatic. In
such cases, adjudicators should accord deference to national political
choices. This is especially true when the TRIPs obligation is expressed in
language that is more in the nature of a standard rather than a specific rule,
where the provision implicates allocation of national resources, and, of
course, where the Agreement specifically recognizes national autonomy.39
35

See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 2, at arts. 23 n.4, 27(3)(b).

36

See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Reexamining Drug Regulation from the Perspective of
Innovation Policy, 160 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 126 (2004).
37

Consider, for example, the proposal in Steven Shavell and Tanguy van Ypersele,
Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights, 44 J. L. & ECON. 525, 529-530 (2001), to give
inventors a choice between a patent and a bounty. The ostensible voluntary nature of the
tradeoff hides the fact that once one inventor in a product market elects the bounty, others
are unlikely to survive on the market charging supracompetitive prices.
38

See, e.g., Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625 (2002); Robert P.
Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights
Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293 (1996).
39

See, e.g., TRIPs Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 41(5) on enforcement obligations.
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It is also worth noting that the places where TRIPs currently envisions nonintellectual property regime enforcement are instances where international
protections are in flux (the protection of plants and geographic indications);
similar flexibility would be useful in other situations that involve emergent
norms (such as trade secrets and rental rights).40
B. Timing
As noted above, Article XIX of the GATT provides another avenue for
accommodating federalism values. Under this provision, compliance is,
essentially, measured over time. WTO members are allowed to suspend
obligations and withdraw concessions for the period necessary to deal
competitively with unforeseen developments that result in an increase in
imports causing, or threatening to cause, serious injury. A calculation
based on increasing imports is not directly transferrable to the TRIPs
Agreement because TRIPs commitments have a more complex effect on
imports: they can lead to a decrease in imports (by raising prices to
supracompetitive levels) or to an increase (by increasing incentives to
exploit the market). Instead, the problem for intellectual property is the
changing nature of science and knowledge production. Technologies are
developed, institutions change, and rights are created, triggering
competitive concerns and threatening progress. Just as members may need
transitional periods where they learn to deal with rising imports, they need
flexibility to deal with these sorts of changes.41
Indeed, an argument can be made that members need even more
flexibility to deal with new technologies than with new trade problems. In
the trade regime, new commodities trigger fresh negotiations. As Andrew
Guzman has pointed out, these negotiations are exercises in sovereignty: an
agreement to a new round of concessions represents a contract among states
to cede authority under specified circumstances.42 With TRIPs, however,
new technologies may be automatically amalgamated into each member’s

40
A problem (or, perhaps, an opportunity) with permitting consideration of such tradeoffs
is that it might touch on the issue of nonviolation complaints. We discuss this topic briefly
below.
41
In fact, the TRIPs Agreement uses temporal mechanisms to create such flexibility in
that it includes transitional rules that reduce compliance obligations for developing
countries. However, these provisions are aimed only at national problems that existed at the
time the Agreement went into force; new developments must be handled through narrowly
drawn provisions like articles 13, 30, and 31, which we previously noted are highly
circumscribed.
42

Andrew T. Guzman, Global Governance and the WTO, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 303, 34647 (2004).
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obligations.43 Since there is no room to exercise sovereign authority at the
time a technology is subsumed in the international regime, greater
autonomy may be needed as its ramifications become evident.
1. Supporting emerging industries
Closest in spirit to Article XIX (as we conceptualize it) would be
measures that relax intellectual property protections to support emerging
information industries. Consider, for example the cable retransmission
rules of the U.S. Copyright Act.44 Because these provisions essentially
reduce the scope of copyright protection by permitting certain free and
unauthorized transmissions, they are not easily understood as a matter of
copyright policy.45 Rather, they are intended to pursue telecommunications
policy–they helped to establish and stabilize cable technology when it was
43

For example, art. 27 requires protection for “all fields of technology” and without
discrimination as to the place of invention. And, more generally, structural provisions (such
as the national treatment and most-favored-nation obligations) and enforcement obligations
apply to “intellectual property,” which might be conceptualized to include new property
rights crafted for emerging technologies. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 2, at arts. 27,
41(1) (“Members shall ensure that enforcement procedures as specified in this Part are
available under their law so as to permit effective action against any act of infringement of
intellectual property rights covered by this Agreement”); J.H. Reichman, Universal
Minimum Standards of Intellectual Property Protection Under the TRIPs Component of the
WTO Agreement, 29 INT. LAW. 345, 350 (1995) (suggesting that whether members can
“escape the MFN and national treatment clauses of the TRIPs Agreement will . . . depend on
a variety of factors” including “the extent to which decision makers interpret ‘intellectual
property’ as narrowly defining the seven categories of subject matter to be protected or as
broadly defining certain modalities of protection.”); Appellate Body Report on United
States–Section 211, supra note 3, at para. 335 (rejecting a narrow reading of the term
“intellectual property”). Thus, it remains an open question whether the European Union’s socalled “database right” can properly be denied nationals of other WTO members without
violating national treatment obligations. See generally, Guido Westkamp, TRIPs Principles,
Reciprocity and the Creation of Sui-Generis-Type Intellectual Property Rights for New
Forms of Technology, 6 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 827 (2003).
44
17 U.S.C. § 111(1999); See also 17 U.S.C. § 119 (2002) (covering satellite
retransmissions).
45

For example, at the birth of cable television, broadcasters and content providers claimed
that copyright incentives would be reduced if retransmission was permitted, see, e.g., STAFF
OF HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION PART 6:
SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF
THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW: 1965 REVISION BILL (Comm. Print 1965) (calling cable
transmissions a “free ride” and a “moral wrong”), yet in a sense, cable would improve
incentives by widening the markets for the protected works. The Supreme Court cases on
this issue, Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968) and
Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974), are hardly
models of clarity.
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under development, and were, in actuality, enacted through a compromise
brokered by the Federal Communications Commission rather than the
Copyright Office.46 These measures were also passed before TRIPs went
into effect and have not been challenged. However, if they became the
subject of a complaint, they would presumably be evaluated under the
three-part test of Article 13. Perhaps they would survive this analysis on
their own. However, we would argue that their survival should not be made
to depend on the happenstance of the formalistic way in which that test is
administered. The retransmission rules were enacted to stimulate the
economy at a crucial time in the development of a technological
infrastructure important to the creative industries. If these industries are to
flourish, and new industries are to emerge, then adjudicators must take a
nation’s decision to support these developments into account when
determining compliance with TRIPs.
To be sure, there is a significant difference between the cable rules and
the measures contemplated by Article XIX: under the GATT, the industrial
support initiative must be temporary. At the end of the day, the United
States could not have used this approach to justify an enduring cable
retransmission law. However, were this form of analysis to become part of
TRIPs jurisprudence, the availability of such a defense might lead Congress
to put sunset provisions into future industry-support legislation. In this
connection, it is not insignificant that many argue that a sunset provision
should have been included in the cable rules, and that, in fact, the
retransmission right should now be changed because the exigencies that
warranted it no longer exist, and–more importantly–because the cable
industry now has so much power, it can use these rules to thwart the vitality
of older technologies (such as broadcast), and to impede the development of
new technologies that are not covered by the provision (such as the
Internet).47

46

See, e.g., Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsideration of Cable Television
Report and Order, FCC 72-108, 36 F.C.C.2d 143 (1972), reconsideration granted in part by
FCC 72-530, 36 F.C.C.2d 326; Timothy Wu, Copyright’s Communications Policy, MICH. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2005), available at http://faculty.virginia.edu/timwu/occp.pdf.
47

An analogue on the patent side may be proposed changes in patent law to accommodate
university-based research. Since passage of the Bayh Dole Act, universities have become
players in the patent system and courts consider them the equivalent of commercial actors.
Yet strong arguments can be made that universities are quite different (their endowments
cannot be deployed as freely as venture capital; human capital is similarly differently
utilized). One could imagine legislative changes that roll back patent protection to support
university research. If such a roll back were challenged in the WTO, we believe that the
motivation to support the vitality of university research should be considered part of the
legislative package. Again, because the nature of university research could be contemplated
to change over time, sunset provisions would help.
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2. Reacting to emerging technologies
Legal change may not only be the catalyst for developing new
technologies, new technologies may also be the catalyst for legal change.
In assessing whether the overall level of intellectual property protection
complies with TRIPs, we believe that adjudicators should take into account
how changing social practices and new technological opportunities alter the
balance of protection accorded to innovative works.
An example is the levy system that most European countries impose
on the sale of recording equipment. Arguably, this is a right of the
copyright owner in that it provides compensation to authors in return for
use of their work in private copying, where it would be difficult to collect
royalties. However, Article 5 of the European Copyright Directive now
contemplates the reduction (arguably to zero) of some of these levy
payments. Although the Europeans claim that the levy system falls outside
the scope of the TRIPs Agreement, abolishing levies arguably “conflict[s]
with the normal exploitation of the work,” in violation of Article 13.
How should such a claim be analyzed? If one looks simply at the levy
reform, the abolition would appear vulnerable to challenge because private
copying “could detract significantly from the economic returns anticipated
from a . . . grant of market exclusivity.”48 Yet, the Directive will reduce
levies only when the application of digital rights management systems
(DRMs) would facilitate a return by copyright owners at least equivalent to
what would have been obtained under levies. To us, the technical capacity
of DRM to secure equivalent returns should be regarded as the tradeoff for
reducing formal legal protections.
More generally, we believe that adjudicators should focus on the
technological context in which legal rules operate.
Without that
perspective, replications of the one-way ratchet phenomenon described
above in connection with the Sonny Bono Act will likely proliferate. Thus,
technological capacity to infringe copyright has been cited as a justification
for national measures enhancing the rights of copyright owners. For
instance, the anticircumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act are often defended on the grounds that widespread copying
has undermined incentives for the production of digitized works.49 Because
48

Panel Report on Canada–Pharmaceutical Products, supra note 11, at ¶ 7.55 (analyzing
the analogous provision in art. 30); see also Panel Report on United States–Section 110(5),
supra note 10, at ¶ 6.183 (holding that an exception would rise “to the level of a conflict
with a normal exploitation of the work . . . if uses, that in principle are covered by that right
but exempted under the exception or limitation, enter into economic competition with the
ways that right holders normally extract economic value from that right to the work . . . and
thereby deprive them of significant or tangible commercial gains”).
49

See Shira Perlmutter, Is Copyright Expanding?, Meyer Memorial Lecture 15-16 (May
21, 2003).
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of the deferential review under national law, these provisions tend to
survive challenge.50 If protection-contracting provisions are subjected to
more intrusive scrutiny, a nation’s ability to consider law and technology as
a package that in combination strikes an appropriate balance of protection
will be distorted: legislators will be able to take into account technology’s
capacity to undermine rights, but not to enhance them. Thus, if
technological tradeoffs can justify the enhancement of protection at the
national level, they should also be available at the international level to
justify contractions.
The packaging of social and legal change is also relevant to initiatives
that respond to the inherent nature of scientific advances. For example,
many recent fundamental discoveries have a dual character; they are both
principles of nature and end-use applications. As such, they are considered
patentable subject matter. But as these “upstream” inventions become
subject to exclusive rights, the conduct of fundamental research may be
impeded and progress stifled. If this proves to be the case, it may become
necessary to reduce the scope of protection, for example by creating an
experimental use defense. But any reduction in scope, if considered
separate and apart from the science that drives it, could result in a
successful challenge in the WTO. To avoid chilling progress, contextual
examination is thus required and the reactionary nature of the contraction
measure should be taken into account in resolving the challenge. If the
combination of the change in science and the legal contraction maintains
similar levels of protection, the legal change should not be regarded as
violating minimum standards. In a sense, those who made fundamental
discoveries are no worse off with a patent of narrow scope than they were
when their work was considered unpatentable.
IV. Countervailing
Democratic Values

Considerations:

Decisionmaking,

Norms,

and

Three sorts of critiques can be leveled at our approach: that it will
make decisionmaking too complex; that it will undermine WTO norms; and
that it will interfere with democratic values.
A. Decision-making
The first problem has been alluded to throughout: measuring tradeoffs
will certainly add to the work required to resolve TRIPs disputes. While we
acknowledge that this is true, we do not believe it to be dispositive.

50

See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001); see also Reese,
supra note 14 (discussing deferential levels of review).
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Our proposal adds to the workload in two ways: it requires panels to
define the terms of the package that produced the challenged action and
then to value the tradeoffs made to determine the package’s overall effect.
As to the first—defining the package—the problem is likely to be
transitory. If member states want to benefit from the type of analysis we
advance, they will surely develop legislative techniques that make the
tradeoffs they enact into law explicit. Such techniques can only be
advantageous, both to the efficiency of WTO dispute resolution and to the
transparency of domestic legislation.
In contrast, evaluating and comparing the elements of a tradeoff are
likely to be enduring concerns, particularly in the case of inter-regime or
external tradeoffs. Such evaluations are, however, likewise a problem with
the GATT as a whole: each round of negotiations requires members to
determine whether the benefits they receive in one area are worth the costs
suffered in other sectors.51 Members have not pulled out of the GATT
because of the difficulty of this task, even after the Uruguay Round made
valuations even more complex by requiring tradeoffs between intellectual
property and trade protection. Admittedly, accurate valuation is more
critical in the rule-bound context of adjudication than it is in the diplomatic
environment of negotiation, where members retain the sovereign authority
to broker deals. However, even the adjudication of minimum-standards
complaints has not proved straightforward; analyzing legislation
contextually is likely to prove a marginal complication.52
B. WTO norms
There are several bases on which it could be claimed that an approach
of the type we suggest is incompatible with evolving norms within the
WTO.
To begin, there are at least two decisions that reject the notion of
tradeoffs.53 As to these, however, we note that both concern denials of
national treatment. National treatment goes to the heart of the TRIPs
Agreement; it is a commitment that structures the core relationship between
51
See, e.g., Guzman, supra note 42, at 319-320. For example, it has been suggested to us
that the tradeoff of the Sony Bono Act is not sufficient because the future value of the last 20
years of the copyright term is very low. However, the compensation the United States is
paying on account of the Section 110(5) violation is likewise modest.
52

See Panel Report on United States–Section 110(5), supra note 10; see also Report of
Arbitrators, United States–Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act–Recourse to Arbitration
under Article 25 of the DSU, WT/DS160/ARB25/1 (Nov. 9, 2001), available at
http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search [hereinafter Report of Arbitrators, United States–
Section 110(5)].
53

See Panel Report on United States–Section 337, supra note 3; Appellate Body Report
on United States–Section 211, supra note 3.
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member states. It has been the foundation for international intellectual
property law for over a century, and a cornerstone of the trade regime of
which intellectual property law is now part. Here, the principles of the
trade regime and the international intellectual property system have been
consonant for an extended period of time. The right to discriminate among
trading partners is the one element of sovereignty that a nation clearly cedes
when it joins the WTO and the international intellectual property system.
As we argue elsewhere, it is not as easy to read into the Agreement the
decision to cede other facets of sovereignty–including the right to continue
to make law in the manner in which the nation is accustomed.
More important objections relate to the analogies we draw to Articles
XXVIII and XIX. Of these, the most serious is the claim that these
provisions are an artifact of the original GATT and have no place in the
system of binding and predicable rules that has evolved over the last halfcentury.54 Indeed, the United States’ loss in the Steel Safeguards Case55
may be an indication that no safeguard measure will ever be approved by
the Appellate Body.56
We do not believe that these observations diminish the force of our
argument. That fifty years’ experience has apparently produced a clear
understanding of the trade rules is heartening, but it would be a mistake to
think that the knowledge that has been acquired is a function of the dispute
resolution mechanism in place, or that it extends to intellectual property,
which presents issues quite different from those arising in trade.57
Furthermore, we are reluctant to conclude that the absence of winning cases
based on these provisions mean they are ineffective. To the contrary, it is
quite likely that complaints are not brought when it is clear that one of these
provisions would provide a full defense. By the same token, the actions
members take may well be guided by their perceptions of what actions are
permissible. These provisions are, in short, background rules and our
argument is that they are as necessary in the intellectual property context as
they are in trade, at least in the early years of the intellectual property
agreement.
54

See, e.g., Debra P. Steger, Afterword: The “Trade and . . .” Conundrum–A
Commentary, 96 AM J. INT’L L. 135, 137-138 (2002).
55

Appellate Body Report on United States–Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of
Certain Steel Products, WT/DS248/AB/R, WT/DS249/AB/R, WT/DS251/AB/R,
WT/DS252/AB/R,
WT/DS253/AB/R,
WT/DS254/AB/R,
WT/DS258/AB/R,
WT/DS259/AB/R, AB-2003-3 (issued November 10, 2003, adopted December 10, 2003)
[hereinafter Appellate Body Report on United States–Steel Safeguard Measures].
56

See, e.g., Raj Bhala & David A Gantz, WTO Case Review 2003, 21 ARIZ. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 317, 401 (2004).
57

See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Two Achievements of the
Uruguay Round: Putting TRIPs and Dispute Settlement Together¸ 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 275,
280-282 (1997).
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But even under the assumption that these provisions are of enduring
significance, problems with our analogy remain. The GATT contemplates
consultation among trading partners before action is taken, while we do not.
We agree that a practice of consultation is far preferable to a system in
which compliance can be rolled back unilaterally. It would avoid surprises
and create an opportunity for member states to discuss approaches to new
problems. TRIPs does not create a harmonized system, but strong
arguments can be made that a degree of global harmonization would be
helpful. An avenue to provide for it on a forward-going basis would be an
excellent provision to add to the Agreement in a future round. But the
inability to impute a specific consultation requirement should not doom our
approach. It is not clear that the consultation requirements of Articles
XXVIII and XIX have always been complied with in the past, and yet
complaints have not been brought on that basis alone. If some sort of
reckoning with trade partners is regarded as important, it could be fostered
by having panels entertaining complaints consider whether the state made
voluntary attempts to address the issue in the TRIPs Council before
changing its law. Further, there is some flexibility to achieve a similar
result through the remedial provisions of the GATT.
Thus, the
Understanding of Dispute Settlement contemplates the possibility of
negotiating acceptable compensation in lieu of changing a law found
incompatible with TRIPs.58 One way to avoid unraveling domestic deals
would be through such a payment–which, in fact, is precisely the approach
the United States took in the 110(5) case.59 Although this approach has
problems of its own,60 payments could be considered substitutes for a
consultation requirement pending consideration of this issue in the next
round.
Additionally, we should acknowledge that Article XIX has been
interpreted to require a sudden increase in imports.61 Our proposal does not
58

Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 22.1,
Dec. 15, 1993, WTO Agreement, supra note 2, Annex 2, 1869 I.N.I.T.S. 401, 33 I.L.M 1226
(1994).
59

See Report of Arbitrators, United States–Section 110(5), supra note 52; see also John H.
Jackson, International Law Status of WTO Dispute Settlement Reports: Obligation to
Comply or Option to “Buy Out”, 98 Am. J. Int’l L. 109 (2004) (discussing whether the
provision of compensation represents satisfaction of a country's legal obligations, or whether
instead there exists an international law obligation to comply with a dispute settlement
report),
60

Side payments are problematic because they can be used only by countries that are rich
enough to afford them, because they do not necessarily compensate the parties harmed by
the violation, and because they could undermine the overall objectives of the WTO system
as a whole.
61

Appellate Body Report on United States–Steel Safeguard Measures, supra note 55, at ¶
340 (“recent enough, sudden enough, sharp enough, and significant enough . . . to cause or
threaten to cause ‘serious injury.’”).
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require sudden change. However, it is not clear where the suddenness
requirement comes from–it is not found in Article XIX or in the Safeguards
Agreement.62 Nor does this requirement fit well in the context of
knowledge production. To the extent that suddenness was introduced to
encourage states to follow trends, extrapolate from them, and take
prophylactic action to help domestic producers mitigate the effect of
imports—it is not realistic for TRIPs. The Agreement covers a vast array of
fields. It applies to activity that occurs in garrets and garages, in labs and
lobes. Changes are not immediately apparent or public. Indeed, one of the
innovations of TRIPs is the protection of confidential information and trade
secrets.
As a result, governments cannot be expected to follow
developments in science and culture in the way that a trade ministry can
monitor the effect of imports on domestic industries.
Finally, it can be argued that the absence of provisions similar to Arts.
XXVIII and XIX in TRIPs negate the availability of the types of flexibility
that we propose. We have already hinted that we are not seriously
disturbed by expressio unius arguments. A system with judicial bite is new
to the international intellectual property regime; it is not conceivable that all
possible issues were considered before the Agreement was promulgated.
Further, because the system was largely negotiated by trade hands, the
dynamics of intellectual property lawmaking were not fully appreciated. In
particular, the history of TRIPs makes it apparent that negotiators did not
have the incentive to fully grapple with the importance of achieving a
balance between proprietary rights and public access interests; rather,
protection was regarded as an unmitigated benefit in exactly the same way
that free trade was regarded as an unequivocal social good.63 Further, it
may be that the negotiators thought that the provisions that were included
provided a sufficient level of flexibility;64 it is only now that the formalism
of dispute resolution, and the structural implications of certain provisions,
are fully appreciated that the need for specific outlets for domestic dealmaking are clear.65 TRIPs was itself a political package at the international
62
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See Bhala & Gantz, supra note 56, at 408.

See, e.g., SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 75-95 (2003).
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These would include arts. 7, 8, 13, 27(3), 30, 31, and 41(5). See generally Reichman,
supra note 43.
65
Indeed, in addition to adopting a new mechanism to deal with national health
emergencies, see Declaration on the TRIPs Agreement and Public Health, supra note 20,
negotiators have, since TRIPs, extended the moratorium on nonviolation complaints and
lengthened some of the transitional periods available for least-developing countries. See
WTO 4th Ministerial Conference, Declaration on Implementation-Related Issues and
Concerns
¶
11,
WT/MIN(01)/17
(14
Nov.
2001),
available
at
www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_implementation_e.htm
[hereinafter Declaration on Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns]; Declaration on
the TRIPs Agreement and Public Health, supra note 20, ¶ 7 (transition periods).
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level; the importance of making deals should not be lost in its
interpretation. To put this another way, even if the GATT did not include
provisions like Arts. XIX and XXVIII, we would be making the same
argument about a need for escape valves that accommodate the dynamics of
domestic lawmaking.
We also recognize another normative objection to our proposal, which
is that there is a danger specific to the notion of taking into account
measures that are not codified in intellectual property laws (as defined by
the TRIPs Agreement). If non-intellectual property laws can be proffered
as evidence of compliance with the Agreement, then symmetry might be
said to demand that nonintellectual property laws should be subject to
challenge under TRIPs as violation complaints. We reject the inevitability
of that argument. In the cases envisioned here, the packaging of nonintellectual property tradeoffs with intellectual property measures provides
a nexus between the enactment and the TRIPs Agreement. In such cases,
the intent to effectuate an intellectual property result can be presumed (the
Hatch-Waxman Act’s FDA provisions are examples). But when a
nonintellectual property law is enacted as a free-standing measure, it should
not automatically invoke TRIPs obligations. Without the intellectual
property packaging, no motivation should be imputed.
This is not to say that nonintellectual property measures should evade
TRIPs scrutiny. However, challenges to the side-effects that such measures
have on intellectual property rights are more naturally categorized as
nonviolation complaints because they frustrate the objectives of the
Agreement rather than breach specific obligations. The role of these
complaints and the modality of enforcing them are currently under
discussion within the TRIPs Council.66 The conditions under which a
nonviolation complaint can be brought and the scrutiny that will be given to
a measure challenged in this fashion will almost certainly be different from
the way that violation complaints are handled because different policy
considerations apply. Thus, it is important to prevent manipulation of the
characterization of the national measure to achieve differing levels of
scrutiny. At the same time, the availability of a tradeoff defense should
inform the discussions of the TRIPs Council on the conditions under which
nonviolation complaints should be available. By the same token, an
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In Paragraph 11(1) of the Ministerial Declaration on Implementation-Related issues and
concerns, agreed at Doha on November 14, 2001, Member States directed that “The TRIPs
Council . . . continue its examination of the scope and modalities for [non-violation
complaints . . . and make recommendations to the Fifth Session of the Ministerial
Conference [in Cancun 2003]. It is agreed that, in the meantime, members will not initiate
such complaints under the TRIPs Agreement.” Declaration on Implementation-Related
Issues and Concerns, supra note 65. No resolution of the issue was reached at the Cancun
Ministerial Conference.
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analysis of a tradeoff defense should be shaped by the outcome of the
Council’s deliberations.67
C. Democratic values
It has been forcefully argued that the constraints imposed by the WTO
system enhance democratic values because the GATT operates as a precommitment strategy that reduces rent seeking by certain powerful interest
groups.68 An approach that relaxes those constraints is, arguably, a move in
the wrong direction. More prosaically, it could be claimed that any system
that promotes logrolling is bad by definition.
In considering this issue, it is important to keep the differences
between trade and intellectual property in mind. Given the theoretical
premises underlying the GATT, it is easy to understand the argument that
GATT is democracy-enhancing. Under that view, free trade is regarded as
an unambiguous good because reaping comparative advantages increases
social wealth.
Interest groups that seek to undermine free trade
(“protectionists” in trade parlance) are thinking irrationally or in too short a
term. Unfortunately, they include labor and other highly organized entities,
while those who stand to benefit from free trade are largely unorganized
consumers. Without a powerful side constraint, in the form of an
enforceable international agreement, the concentrated group will win
domestically, thereby undermining the good of the majority.
Whatever one might think of this argument in the trade context, it is
clearly not applicable to intellectual property. In the intellectual property
story, the “protectionists” are still the more highly organized group, but the
67

Again, it can be argued that WTO members have come to prefer a strict rules-based
system in which the “meaningful cause of action for transgressions of th[e] rules is a claim
of violating them.” Steger, supra note 54, at 138. We remain skeptical as to whether the allor-nothing approach that has evolved in trade will ultimately prove to be an appropriate
response to developments on the intellectual property side, especially in its early years. See
generally, Bagwell et. al., supra note 24, at 65-67 (finding a place for nonviolation
complaints in the context of nontrade policies that impinge on trade).
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See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution, 114
HARV. L. REV. 511 (2000). More broadly viewed, our proposal may in fact further
democratic values. The notion that a domestically balanced package might have improper
distorting effects on trade in the broader political arena is of course well recognized in
Commerce Clause case law of the United States Supreme Court and in the free movement
jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice. But we note that the level of scrutiny applied
to such national legislation vis-à-vis the “federal” area is essentially an allocation of
prescriptive power between the local and federal authorities. The respective claims of the
federal government in the United States and (to a lesser extent) the European Union, on the
one hand, and the constituent states of those federal unions, on the other, should be
calibrated differently than in the WTO context because the WTO does not possess the same
direct claims of legitimacy that the United States or (to a lesser extent) the EU could make.
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TRIPs Agreement does not constrain them–instead it favors them by
insuring that they will enjoy certain minimum levels of protection. It is
user groups–the groups that are less organized domestically–who are
constrained by TRIPs. In effect, the Agreement reduces their domestic
leverage by exposing their legislative wins to the scrutiny of dispute
resolution while leaving their legislative losses alone. And yet it is not
clear that they are the ones who are thinking irrationally or in the short
term. Because knowledge is cumulative and one person’s output is
another’s input, intellectual property law needs a domain in which access to
information is assured. Accordingly, the law must strive for a balance
between producer and user interests. As we have shown, overly narrow or
formalistic an application of TRIPs can easily destroy the ability of nations
to strike that balance.
A system that takes tradeoffs into account can, of course, be
condemned as logrolling—as facilitating the raw power of particular
interest groups and other rent seekers.69 However, it is logrolling of a
peculiar kind. Because it is only effective as a defense to a TRIPs
challenge when there are compensatory benefits on all sides, it creates, in
essence, leverage for the benefit of those less able to help themselves
(usually, user groups) and, in the final analysis, promotes the enactment of
balanced legislation. The nature of the logrolling induced by this proposal is
also quite constrained. The tradeoffs must be internal to the system of
promoting intellectual progress and initiatives that include a close nexus
between expanded and contracted protection (such as tradeoffs within a
particular intellectual property regime) are more likely to survive scrutiny
than those that do not have such a nexus. This system has other advantages
as well. It renders lawmaking more transparent because it rewards clear
articulation of the tradeoffs in the legislative package.
Furthermore, the standard critiques of legislative outcomes produced
by rent-seeking tend to assume that interest groups have only one forum (a
domestic legislature) in which to advance their agendas. Once the
possibility of multiple fora—and forum shopping—is introduced into the
equation, the analysis might change.70 Enabling accommodation of
competing interests within a single domestic institution, as effected by a
more generous treatment of tradeoffs under the WTO system, would reduce
the need to achieve balance through alternative avenues (such as the
development of contrary norms in foreign or international systems). There
69
For a classic account of interest group analysis, see Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting
Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model,
86 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1986). In some ways, this approach to TRIPs adjudication accords
nicely with Macey’s notions of statutory interpretation. It recognizes the reality of interest
group activity, rewards explicit tradeoffs, and ultimately makes for law that is more publicregarding.
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See JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION 564 (2000)
(suggesting different forms of “forum-shifting”).
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may be benefits to be gained by encouraging groups to achieve their goals
through domestic compromise rather than through forum-shifting or
regime-shifting.
Seeking substantive compromise within a single
institution is likely to be more transparent than the more clandestine backand forth of multi-forum lawmaking, which often gives an advantage to
those with insider status. Moreover, the results that emanate from a single
institutional process are less likely to be a function of the resources of
interest groups to engage in transnational lobbying.
By the same token, developing countries have recently seen regimeshifting as a bulwark against the established power balance in international
lawmaking, and over time user groups might likewise view the ability to
shift forum as a valuable defensive technique.71 And the lesser need to use
alternative fora to resolve disagreements is unlikely to constrain interest
groups that believe that a more favorable compromise can be achieved than
through a domestic deal. Finally, digital communication may be facilitating
the development of transnational civil society networks that can
increasingly engage with rights holders simultaneously in multiple fora.72
On balance, the conventional critiques of logrolling are less weighty when
the possibility of forum-shifting is introduced to the equation. But we
claim the advantages for our approach conscious that the benefits that
accrue to the lawmaking system are not without possible costs.
V. Conclusion
Our analysis shows the complex, interactive dynamic that now
operates in intellectual property lawmaking. Domestic lawmaking and
national adjudication increasingly involve international lawmaking
processes.73 Likewise, international lawmakers and adjudicators must take
into account political strategies found in national lawmaking, including the
practice of tradeoffs, the increasing need to refer to technological or social
practices in fashioning appropriate levels of legal protection, and the
capacity of non-intellectual property regimes to work in combination with
71

Recent history suggests that developing countries on occasion may also wish to pursue
regime-shifting strategies. See Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement
and New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 1
(2004) (noting that regime shifting may be pursued by both developed and developing
countries). Doctrines that discourage alternative fora might also reduce the number of
competing norms or approaches that are developed globally; yet a broad menu of empirically
tested options might usefully contribute toward the development of an international standard.
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See generally KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 15 (discussing transnational advocacy
networks).
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See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (considering the scope of Congress'
constitutional powers in light of the interest in harmonizing U.S. and European Union law);
Perlmutter, supra note 13, at 330.
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traditional intellectual property rights. The deployment of these lawmaking
strategies at the national level will differ from country to country depending
not only on varying priorities in innovation policy, but also on differences
in their political economy. We believe that the long-term vitality and
credibility of the international system depends upon accommodating
diversity of political economy as well as a diversity of substantive
intellectual property strategies. To do so, however, might require a less
formalistic approach to WTO dispute settlement.
We advance that proposition aware of the broader effect that a more
flexible approach to forms of national implementation of intellectual
property norms might have on the political structure of WTO member
states. The WTO system does more than promote free trade. It is often
defended as a means to effect juridicization in countries until recently
laboring under the weight of totalitarian regimes, or to confine the excesses
of political influence in democratic polities. Our recommendations may in
fact advance these broader goals, in that, depending upon the doctrines
selected to implement them, they may also impose constraints (albeit
different constraints from those imposed by current interpretations of the
TRIPs Agreement) on state lawmaking. For example, we believe that,
especially in so far as they reward transparency in the political process,
these new constraints are less damaging than the current ones and may even
have some positive benefits. And to the extent that such goals as spreading
the reach of certain democratic norms are slowed by our suggestions, we
take the view that imposing a formalist, monolithic view of intellectual
property rights is not the appropriate way to realize these otherwise
important objectives, and the costs to innovation worldwide from such an
approach would be too great to bear.
We have sought to implement this philosophy in the context of
interpretive strategies that might be deployed by WTO dispute settlement
panels and, to a lesser extent, in the development by the TRIPs Council of a
role for nonviolation complaints. These are the fora in which the most
immediate development of the TRIPs system is occurring. But it may be
that the approach that we suggest cannot easily be accommodated within
the current structure of the Agreement, in which case it would be
appropriate for international negotiators to work toward a modification of
the international intellectual property system, perhaps using models found
in the trade context.

